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I. INTRODUCTION
Keith Allison was a tutor at an elementary school in Green Local School
District in Wayne County, Ohio. By all accounts, he was a high-performing
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employee, earning the best ranking possible on his end-of-year evaluation.1
On August 19, 2014, as he was preparing for his second year as a tutor, he
was summoned to meet with his principal and superintendent.2 During the
meeting, he was questioned about a recent post on his Facebook page that
featured a photograph of calves confined in small crates on a local dairy
farm.3 Accompanying the photos, Allison had written a brief message criticizing the treatment of the calves and advocating for plant-based milks.4 His
superintendent advised him that there were a large number of dairy farmers in
Wayne County and that teachers should not offend this constituency.5 Allison was told that his contract had not been renewed and that he could work
the remainder of the week, but at a reduced compensation level.6 He filed
suit with the support of the American Civil Liberties Union and People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals.7 The school district eventually settled for
back pay and legal expenses and reinstated Allison as a middle school tutor.8
Keith Allison’s story is hardly unique. Many educators have found their
careers interrupted due to seemingly innocuous online expression. In 2009, a
high school teacher in Winder, Georgia, was forced to resign after school
officials became aware of Facebook pictures from her European vacation that
showed her holding wine and beer, even though she had not given students
access to her page.9 In 2012, a Manhattan school counselor was fired days
short of gaining tenure after online photographs surfaced from her previous
career as a lingerie model twenty years earlier.10 In 2013, a girls basketball
coach in Pocatella, Idaho, was fired after posting an “immoral” vacation picture that showed her in a swimsuit with her fiancé, who had his hand resting
on her bikini top.11
1. Complaint at 4, Allison v. Bd. of Educ. of Green Local Sch. Dist., No. 5:15cv-00416 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id. at 6.
7. Eric Heisig, Teacher Settles Lawsuit Against Wayne County School District
over Facebook Posts Touting Veganism, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 14, 2015, 11:10
AM),
http://www.cleveland.com/courtjustice/index.ssf/2015/04/teacher_settles_lawsuit_agains.html.
8. Id.
9. Georgia Teacher’s Lawsuit over Facebook Firing Continues, LEGALZOOM
(Sept. 7, 2015), http://blog.legalzoom.com/privacy/georgia-teachers-lawsuit-overfacebook-firing-continues/.
10. Susan Edelman, Manhattan HS Guidance Counselor Stripped of Job over
POST
(Oct.
7,
2012,
4:00
AM),
Steamy-Photo
Past,
N.Y.
http://nypost.com/2012/10/07/manhattan-hs-guidance-counselor-stripped-of-job-oversteamy-photo-past/.
11. Katie Kindelan, Idaho High School Coach Fired for “Immoral” Facebook
Photo,
ABC
NEWS
(Nov.
7,
2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/11/idaho-high-school-coach-fired-for-
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Public educators’ social media posts, however, are not always innocuous. In some cases, an individual’s social media speech may clearly provide
evidence of a lack of fitness as an educator. Karen Fitzgibbons, a fourth
grade teacher in the small west Texas district of Frenship, was terminated
after she advocated through Facebook for the return of racial segregation.12
Her post came in the wake of a Dallas area pool party at which a police officer was captured on video wrestling a teenage African-American girl to the
ground and then pulling his weapon on a group of young African-American
bystanders.13 Upset over the subsequent resignation of the officer involved,
Fitzgibbons blamed both the African-American children and their parents:
I guess that’s what happens when you flunk out of school and have no
education. I’m sure their parents are just as guilty for not knowing
what their kids were doing; or knew it and didn’t care. I’m almost to
the point of wanting them all segregated on one side of town so they
can hurt each other and leave the innocent people alone . . . .14

In the 1968 case Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court
officially extended conditional First Amendment free speech rights to public
educators.15 Pickering established that public employees have First Amendment rights as citizens to comment on matters of “public concern”; however,
those rights must be balanced against the State’s rights as an employer to
efficiently manage the public services it provides.16 In 1982, the Court narrowed the scope of public employee speech rights in Connick v. Myers, holding employee speech that addresses “private interests” does not merit First
Amendment protection.17 As of early 2017, the Court had not yet heard a
case dealing with the social media expression of a public employee.18 With
immoral-facebook-photo/. A state grievance panel later overturned the termination.
Jimmy Hancock, Grievance Panel: Fired Pocatello High School Girls’ Basketball
Coach Should Get Job Back, IDAHO ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2013),
http://idahostatejournal.com/members/grievance-panel-fired-pocatello-high-schoolgirls-basketball-coach-should/article_3c9ec8b6-6c40-11e3-99aa-0019bb2963f4.html.
12. Sophia Tesfaye, “I’m Almost to the Point of Wanting Them All Segregated”:
Texas Teacher Pens Breathtakingly Racist McKinney Post, SALON (June 11, 2015,
3:35
PM),
http://www.salon.com/2015/06/11/im_almost_to_the_point_of_wanting_them_all_se
gregated_texas_teacher_pens_breathtakingly_racist_mckinney_post/.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
16. Id. at 568.
17. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
18. With social media use ubiquitous throughout society, it seems inevitable that
a case involving the social media expression of a public employee will eventually
reach the Supreme Court. The Court has ruled in one case involving a police officer
who made, starred in, and marketed police-themed pornography online. See City of
San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam); see discussion infra Part II.B.
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no clear Supreme Court precedent, legal scholars have voiced concern that
the public concern/private interest distinction in Connick could allow courts
to unnecessarily limit teachers’ rights regarding online expressive activity,
even when that speech has no negative impact on the school environment.19
How can public school administrators reach legally and ethically defensible decisions in cases as widely divergent as Keith Allison and Karen Fitzgibbons? How can they protect the efficacy of their school systems while
still respecting the First Amendment rights of their employees? When can
they take adverse employment action against educators on the basis of speech
that is posted online, and under what circumstances is that speech protected?
Does the Connick public concern requirement effectively remove all constitutional protection from public educators who are active on social media, irrespective of whether their speech is disruptive? This Article addresses these
questions by examining the developing law regarding the free speech rights
of public employees, with a focus on how the Connick public concern/private
interest dichotomy has been applied to social media and other electronic
speech. Part II reviews Supreme Court precedent, from Pickering and Connick through the Court’s post-Connick decisions. Part III highlights circuit
conflict and scholarly criticism associated with the public concern/private
interest question introduced in Connick. Part IV analyzes recent federal cases
dealing specifically with online speech of public employees. Finally, Part V
concludes by proposing an analytical framework designed to enable school
administrators to make legally defensible decisions that both protect institutional efficacy and advance public educators’ First Amendment free speech
rights.

II. THE SUPREME COURT
On multiple occasions, the Supreme Court has issued guidance on the
issue of public employees and their First Amendment speech rights. This
section will provide a review of that precedent in the following manner.
First, it examines the two Court decisions that have provided the essential
framework for examining the free speech claims of public employees over the
last four decades: Pickering v. Board of Education20 and Connick v. Myers.21
Second, it focuses on the Court’s subsequent attempts to apply the principles
from Pickering and Connick.
19. See D. Gordon Smith, Comment, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free
Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 255–56 (1990);
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the First Amendment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1630–31 (2012); Patricia Nidiffer, Comment, Tinkering
with Restrictions on Educator Speech: Can School Boards Restrict What Educators
Say on Social Networking Sites?, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 115, 118–19 (2010);
Lumturije Akiti, Note, Facebook Off Limits? Protecting Teachers’ Private Speech on
Social Networking Sites, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 149–50 (2012).
20. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563.
21. Connick, 461 U.S. 138.
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A. Pickering and Connick
Walter Pickering was a public high school teacher who wrote to the editor of a local paper a letter that contained criticism of the school board’s use
of funds from a 1961 bond election.22 He also suggested in his letter that the
superintendent had used heavy-handed tactics to coerce teacher support of a
failed referendum.23 The school board, concluding that Pickering’s claims
were false and brought into question their “motives, honesty, integrity, truthfulness, responsibility and competence,” terminated Pickering’s employment.24 Pickering challenged the action, alleging that it was illegal retaliation
for the exercise of his First Amendment speech rights.25
The Court agreed. Writing for the majority, Justice Thurgood Marshall
sought to strike an appropriate balance between the rights of “the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern” and the “State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.”26 In order for protected speech to justify a public
school teacher’s dismissal, Justice Marshall argued, the employer would have
to demonstrate that the employee’s expression somehow interfered with
school operations, impeded the employee’s ability to perform his job duties,
or constituted a willful or reckless false statement.27 As examples of expressive activities that might present permissible grounds for termination, Justice
Marshall specifically cited speech that breached confidentiality or undermined superior/subordinate relationships.28 Justice Marshall also reasoned
that a public educator might sometimes engage in expression “so without
foundation that it calls into question his fitness to perform his duties in the
classroom.”29
In applying its balancing test, the Court concluded there was no reason
to believe Pickering’s letter disrupted school district business or damaged his
ability to effectively function as a teacher.30 Although the board members
had alleged that the letter had a deleterious effect on their professional reputations, no evidence supporting these allegations had been introduced at trial.31
In fact, with the exception of the board members themselves, most in the
community had greeted Pickering’s letter with “massive apathy and total
disbelief.”32 Pickering did not report directly to or even regularly interact
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 575.
Id.
Id. at 567.
Id.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 570 n.3.
Id. at 573 n.5.
Id. at 570–71.
Id. at 570.
Id.
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with board members or the superintendent, so his speech did not interfere
with working relationships.33 In fact, though the letter may have upset the
superintendent and board members, the majority found that it was inconsequential to Pickering’s ability to perform his job or to the functioning of the
school system in general.34
Fewer than fifteen years after granting limited First Amendment rights
to public employees, the Court held that not all public employee expressive
activities merit First Amendment protection.35 Connick v. Myers arose out of
an employment dispute in an urban district attorney’s office.36 Sheila Myers
was an assistant district attorney in New Orleans when, in the fall of 1980,
she was informed by her boss, District Attorney Harry Connick, that she was
being transferred to another division of the criminal court.37 Rather than accept her transfer quietly, Myers prepared and distributed a survey to approximately fifteen other assistant district attorneys, soliciting input on a variety
of topics, including office morale, confidence in supervisors, and whether
there should be an official “grievance committee.”38 Additionally, she questioned her colleagues about whether they had ever felt pressured to work on
political campaigns.39
Upon learning that Myers had distributed the survey, which was termed
a “mini-insurrection” by another member of the office, Connick informed
Myers that she was terminated as a result of her failure to accept her transfer.40 Myers filed suit against Connick, claiming that the termination was in
retaliation for her exercise of protected speech under the First Amendment.41
Applying Pickering, the district court held in favor of Myers, ordering reinstatement, as well as back pay and damages.42 Although Connick claimed
that Myers’s refusal to accept the transfer was the reason for her termination,
the district court viewed this as pretext and suggested that the real reason for
her termination was the distribution of the office survey.43 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed.44
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. The Court distinguished Myers’s survey from Pickering’s letter, suggesting the survey addressed matters
almost exclusively of private interest.45 Employee speech that does not ad-

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 146.
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dress a matter of public concern should be beyond judicial oversight.46 If
employee speech can fairly be characterized as pertaining to a matter of personal or private concern, employers should enjoy broad latitude to reach negative employment decisions without the courts second-guessing them.
“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern,”
the Court explained, “must be determined by the content, form, and context
of a given statement.”47 In examining the content of Myers’s speech, the
Court concluded that only one question on her survey – the one dealing with
pressure to support certain political candidates – dealt with a public concern.48 Regarding form and context, the Court focused on Myers’s motivation in distributing the survey, which it viewed as purely self-serving.49
“Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District Attorney’s Office
was not discharging its government responsibilities in the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases,” wrote Justice White, “nor did Myers seek to
bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the
part of Connick and others.”50 The primary purpose of the survey, the Court
suggested, was to “gather ammunition for another round of controversy with
her superiors.”51
The Court’s verbiage was narrow, qualifying its holding as establishing
that:
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal
interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not
the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.52

The test became a “threshold question” through which all public employee
expression must pass before advancing to balancing under Pickering.53 Taken together, Pickering and Connick provide that the First Amendment protects public educators only when they speak as citizens on matters of public
concern and to the extent that the speech does not interfere with school operations or employee effectiveness.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 147–48.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
Id. at 150.
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B. The Post-Connick Era
In the post-Connick era, the Court has sent somewhat mixed messages
regarding the public concern requirement articulated in Connick. In 1984, the
Court denied certiorari in Rowland v. Mad River School District, thus allowing a troubling Sixth Circuit decision to stand.54 In Rowland, a guidance
counselor at Stebbins High School in Montgomery County, Ohio, was fired
for confiding in coworkers that she was bisexual.55 The Sixth Circuit held
that her speech did not touch on a matter of public concern and was, therefore, unprotected.56 The court so ruled despite evidence that the employee’s
revelation had not interfered with her job effectiveness or adversely impacted
the operation of the school in general.57 “Under the Connick test Ms. Rowland’s statements were not protected speech,” wrote Chief Judge Pierce Lively.58 The court further noted, “It is clear that she was speaking only in her
personal interest.”59
Justice Brennen, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented in the denial of
certiorari, harshly criticizing the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit and suggesting
that it was based upon a “crabbed reading of our precedents.”60 Brennen even
suggested that the Court’s true motivation was to avoid the larger question at
stake in the case: whether a state employee could be fired because of his or
her sexual orientation.61 Though one’s sexual preferences are essentially
private, Justice Brennen suggested that the rights accorded to the LGBT
community, even in the mid-1980s, were a matter of public concern.62 Even
if Rowland’s speech were of private interest, Justice Brennen argued, it deserved First Amendment protection.63 The overarching goal of the Court in
Pickering and Connick was to draw a balance between the rights of state employees to express themselves and the interests of “public employers in operating their workplaces without disruption.”64 “Speech, even if characterized
as private, is entitled to constitutional protection,” as long as it “does not in
any way interfere with employer’s business.”65
In 1987, the Court addressed whether a public employer could legally
dismiss an employee for a private remark overheard by another colleague.66
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (mem.).
Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 449.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1011 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting in the petition for writ of certiorari).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1014–15.
63. Id. at 1013.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1012.
66. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
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The incident that led to Deputy Constable Ardith McPherson’s firing occurred on March 30, 1981 – the date of the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan.67 Upon hearing about the incident, McPherson commented to her boyfriend, also employed by the constable, “[I]f they go for
him again, I hope they get him.”68 A third party overheard the comment and
reported it to the constable, who fired McPherson immediately.69 The Court
clarified what may or may not be considered a “public concern” by focusing
on the inherent public nature of the comment’s subject matter.70
Justice Marshall wrote for the majority, following the reasoning in both
Pickering and Connick, and agreed with the Fifth Circuit that McPherson’s
speech touched on a matter of public concern that was of the utmost importance: the life and death of the President.71
Justice Lewis Powell, in a concurring opinion, took a different approach.
He argued that it was unnecessary to apply the “extensive analysis normally
required by Connick v. Myers,” given that McPherson’s remark was part of a
private conversation with her boyfriend.72 McPherson could not have reasonably expected that her comment would have reached anyone outside of the
other party involved in the conversation.73 He noted, “The risk that a single,
offhand comment directed to only one other worker will lower morale, disrupt the work force, or otherwise undermine the mission of the office borders
on the fanciful.”74
The Court reinforced the idea that the non-disruptive private speech of
government employees is protected in the 1995 decision United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU).75 The NTEU case involved a
challenge to a section of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which banned federal employees from accepting compensation for writing articles or making
speeches.76 The Act’s challengers, which included individual employees and
large unions, argued that the measure would chill speech, a point with which
the Supreme Court agreed.77 But the Court pointed out that almost none of
the employee expression in question had any connection to their jobs, nor
could it be argued that it could have any negative impact on the workplace.78
Fewer than ten years later, a police officer in San Diego unsuccessfully
attempted to rely on NTEU to claim First Amendment protection for his side
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 381.
Id.
Id. at 381–82.
Id. at 384–85.
Id. at 385–87.
Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 457

(1995).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 468.
78. Id. at 465.
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business of producing, starring in, and selling adult videos. In City of San
Diego v. Roe, the Court upheld the municipal police department’s right to
discipline, and ultimately fire, the officer, John Roe, as a result of his adultoriented commercial activity online.79 Roe sold his videos on the “adults
only” section of Ebay.80 The videos were police-themed and featured him
stripping out of a police uniform and engaging in autoerotic acts.81 In addition to the videos, Roe also sold police-related items, such as an official San
Diego police uniform, which is ultimately what drew the attention of Roe’s
supervisor.82
Roe was ordered to discontinue his online enterprise but did not fully
comply, which led the department to initiate termination proceedings.83 Roe
filed suit in federal court, alleging a violation of his First Amendment
rights.84 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city,
holding that Roe’s speech was not of “public concern” under Connick.85 Citing NTEU, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Doe’s speech touched on
a public concern because it did not constitute a workplace grievance, was
unrelated to his employment, and occurred off duty.86
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court distinguished the
speech at issue in NTEU, which was unrelated to and had no impact on the
work or business of the employer, and Doe’s videos, which the Court determined were “linked to his police work, all in a way injurious to his employer.”87 In the Court’s view, Roe sought to take advantage of his employment
as a police officer by identifying himself online as an officer of the law and
theming his videos around his work.88 Videos depicting a police officer “performing indecent acts while in the course of his official duties” would cause
anyone who might view them to develop serious doubts with regard to the
San Diego Police Department’s professionalism and mission.89
In 2006, the Court handed down its most significant decision concerning
public employee speech rights since Connick. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the
Court held that speech occurring in the line of job duties is not protected.90
Richard Ceballos was a deputy assistant district attorney in Los Angeles
County.91 As part of Ceballos’s duties as “calendar deputy,” he would review

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84–85 (2004) (per curiam).
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–23 (2006).
Id. at 413.
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the work of other attorneys in the office at the requests of defense attorneys.92
One such request came early in 2000, when a defense attorney contacted Ceballos about what he believed were inaccuracies in an affidavit that was used
to obtain a search warrant in his client’s case.93 Ceballos notified his superiors of his findings and forwarded a recommendation to drop the case.94 His
superiors proceeded with the prosecution despite his objections.95
Ceballos’s supervisors subsequently stripped him of his position as calendar secretary, transferred him to another courthouse, and denied him a
promotion.96 Believing the actions were taken as a result of his recommendations, he filed a suit in a federal court, alleging that his superiors had illegally
retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment.97 The district
court agreed with Ceballos, finding that his free speech rights were violated.98
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, explaining that he was clearly speaking as a “citizen upon matters of public concern,” and there was no evidence that his
speech had caused any type of disruption.99
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ceballos’s recommendation
to his superiors to drop the case was part of his job; therefore, he was functioning in his role as deputy assistant attorney, not as a private citizen.100
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, “We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”101 In the
Court’s view, Ceballos was not a victim of illegal retaliation over the exercise
of constitutionally protected speech; rather, he was simply disciplined for
poor job performance – in this case, making recommendations that his supervisors may have perceived as “inflammatory or misguided.”102
The Supreme Court cases discussed above establish First Amendment
protection for public employees who speak as citizens on matters of public
concern, so long as their speech does not undermine their job effectiveness or
disrupt workplace operations under Pickering. It is also clear under Garcetti
and Connick that when employees speak pursuant to job duties or on matters
of private interests, they lose that First Amendment protection. What is less
clear is exactly how to determine the nature of an employee’s speech and
whether he is speaking as an employee or citizen. The Court’s admonition to
consider the “content, form and context” of speech has provided minimal
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 413–14.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 415–16.
Id. at 421.
Id.
Id. at 423.
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help, and the Court, in its post-Connick decisions, has struggled to provide
much additional clarity. The resulting ambiguity has led to conflict between
circuit courts and calls from legal scholars to abandon the Connick threshold
test altogether.

III. CONNICK: CONFLICT AND CRITICISM
This section proposes that the Connick decision has left a problematic
First Amendment legacy. It begins by highlighting how a significant interpretive split between circuits has resulted in disparate First Amendment rights
for public employees based upon where they live. Then, it focuses on scholarly criticism of Connick.

A. Conflict Between Circuits
Whatever guidance the Court sought to provide in differentiating citizen
speech on a public concern from employee speech on a private interest has
been insufficient, as circuit courts have taken drastically different approaches.
Specifically, courts have disagreed on what should be the most important
consideration: content, form, or context. The majority of circuits have chosen
a content-based approach in which form and context are largely overlooked if
the speech is inherently of public interest.103 Other circuits, however, have
adopted a contextual approach, allowing form and context of speech to trump
the nature of the content, thus exposing public employees to adverse action
even when the speech content is non-disruptive and touches on a matter of
inherent public concern.104
Contextual circuits place significant weight on both the capacity and the
motivation of the speaker. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Ferrara v.
Mills exemplifies this approach. In Ferrara, the court ruled against a public
school teacher after he criticized his school’s registration, scheduling, and
teacher assignment processes.105 The teacher was not fired after speaking
out, but he was assigned to teach exclusively freshman and sophomore cours-

103. Content-based circuits include the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth. See O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907, 913 (1st Cir. 1993); Cioffi v.
Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2006); Azzaro
v. Cty. of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 978–79 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc); Banks v. Wolfe
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 894 (6th Cir. 2003); Sullivan v. Ramirez, 360 F.3d
692, 699 (7th Cir. 2004); McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.
1983).
104. Contextual circuits include the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh.
See Harris v. City of Va. Beach, 69 F.3d 532, *4–5 (4th Cir. 1995); Terrell v. Univ. of
Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1986); Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589,
594 (8th Cir. 2002); David v. City & Cty. of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1356 (10th Cir.
1996); Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1515–16 (11th Cir. 1986).
105. Ferrara, 781 F.2d at 1516.
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es.106 Though the topics about which he complained might have been inherently of public interest, the court viewed the teacher’s motivation for speaking as purely personal.107 His opposition to the school’s registration system
was driven by the fact that he thought it contributed to difficulties in controlling his classroom.108 The comments regarding teacher assignments were
merely an extension of a personal grievance over the school’s internal policies.109 Finally, the teacher’s criticism of out-of-field placements was motivated by the fact that an out-of-field teacher had been assigned the newly
created social studies class that he wanted to teach.110 Despite the inherent
public interest in the content of the speech, the court held that a “public employee may not transform a personal grievance into a matter of public concern by invoking a supposed popular interest in the way public institutions
are run.”111
Another example of the contextual focus on speaker motivation and capacity is found in the Fifth Circuit’s decision Terrell v. University of Texas
System Police. In this case, the University’s Houston Police Captain Gary
Terrell secretly kept a diary that was critical of his supervisor, Chief Charles
Price.112 Photocopies of the diary were anonymously given to Chief Price,
who terminated Terrell as a result.113 The Fifth Circuit declined to focus on
the “inherent interest or importance of the matters discussed by the employee,” because almost anything said in a public office might possibly be considered of interest to the public.114 Terrell made no effort to communicate the
contents of his journal to anyone else outside the department.115 The court
therefore concluded the journal was the unprotected speech of a disgruntled
government employee, not the protected speech of a citizen.116
Content-based circuits focus more on the nature of the speech and less
on the speaker’s motivation or capacity.117 For example, in McKinley v. City
of Eloy, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Michael McKinley, a peace officer

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1510.
Id. at 1516.
Id. at 1515.
Id. at 1516.
Id.
Id.
Terrell v. Univ. of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1361–62 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1362. Granting First Amendment protection to everything said by a
public employee would be impractical, according to the court. See id.
115. Id. at 1362–63.
116. Id. at 1361. Although no circuit has adopted a “form-based” approach, it is
interesting to note that the form of Terrell’s speech, a privately kept diary, was influential to the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 1362–63. The fact that Terrell took no action to
make his diary public indicated to the court that he was not speaking on a public concern. See id.
117. Smith, supra note 19, at 258–59.
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who was fired after publicly advocating for an increase in pay.118 In holding
that McKinley’s speech passed the “public concern” test, the Ninth Circuit
cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, which stated, “The ‘expressly guaranteed freedoms’ of the first amendment ‘share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication
on matters relating to the functioning of government.’”119 McKinley’s speech
dealt with compensation rates for police officers, which carried implications
related to the city’s ability to recruit and retain qualified officers, as well as
numerous other aspects of police and governmental functioning the court
viewed as being of inherent interest to the public.120
The Sixth Circuit also followed a content-based approach when it decided the case of Netta Banks, an instructional aide in Wolfe County, Kentucky.121 Banks was reassigned after she filed formal complaints with the
State, alleging irregularities in her school’s interview and hiring processes.122
The complaints came after a five-year period during which she repeatedly
interviewed for full-time teaching positions but was never offered a job as a
certified teacher.123 The Sixth Circuit found evidence in Bank’s testimony
that suggested mixed motivation for her complaints – not only her personal
grievance in having been passed over for employment, but also her desire to
bring attention to and correct systemic problems within the hiring process.124
While the court acknowledged that Bank’s complaints were predominately
private, it also found that some of them touched on matters of public concern
and remanded to the district court for balancing under Pickering.125
The split between the contextual and content-based circuits is significant
because it has led to disparate First Amendment protections for public employees depending on where they live. Nowhere is this more clearly seen
than when comparing and contrasting the Tenth Circuit case David v. City &
County of Denver with the Third Circuit case Azzaro v. County of Allegheny.126 Both cases dealt with public employees who complained about sexual
harassment in the public workplace, but the outcomes were starkly different.
The Tenth Circuit shockingly held that a female officer’s complaints of sexual harassment against male officers were personally motivated and did not

118. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983). McKinley
spoke in favor of a police pay raise at a city council meeting. Id.
119. Id. at 1114 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
575 (1980)).
120. Id. at 1114–15.
121. Banks v. Wolfe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888, 893 (6th Cir. 2003).
122. Id. at 891.
123. Id. at 890.
124. Id. at 897.
125. Id.
126. Compare David v. City & Cty. of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1355 (10th Cir.
1996), with Azzaro v. Cty. of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 975–76 (3d Cir. 1997) (en
banc).
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touch on a matter of public concern.127 The capacity in which the employee
spoke was the “fundamental inquiry” in its analysis.128 The speech, according to the court, “was calculated to redress personal grievances [and therefore
spoken as an employee].”129 Had she been motivated to address a broader
public purpose, the court would have viewed her speech as being that of a
citizen.130 Her complaints of sexual harassment, therefore, were unprotected.131 A year later, however, the Third Circuit held that an Allegheny County
employee had engaged in protected speech over a matter of public concern
when she complained to the county commissioner about sexual harassment
by an executive assistant.132 According to the court, the complaint concerned
an “incident of sexual harassment” allegedly perpetrated by someone “exercising authority in the name of a public official.”133 If true, such conduct by a
public official would constitute a form of discrimination that would inherently rise to the level of public concern, regardless of the speaker’s personal
motivation.134 Clearly, public employees who live in contextual circuits have
less extensive speech rights than those who live in content-based circuits, a
disparity that should raise both legal and ethical concerns.

B. Criticism of Connick
In addition to producing conflict and disparity between the circuits,
Connick has drawn sharp criticism from the scholarly community. As early
as 1990, legal scholars were highlighting problems with, and even advocating
abandoning, Connick.135 Gordon Smith, Dean of the J. Reuben Clark Law
School at Brigham Young University, proposed an alternative test of “relatedness,” which would require asking whether the speech occurred away from
the workplace and concerned “matters unrelated to workplace personnel or
policies or unrelated to political issues directly affecting the employee’s
working relationships.”136 In Dean Smith’s proposal, if the employee were to
engage in speech unrelated to and away from the workplace, then he would
be acting in the capacity of a citizen and should be absolutely protected.137 If,
on the other hand, the employee speaks at work or on a matter related to the

127. David, 101 F.3d at 1356.
128. Id. at 1355 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
129. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 483

(10th Cir. 1994)).
130. See David, 101 F.3d at 1355.
131. Id. at 1356.
132. Azzaro v. Cty. of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
133. Id. at 978.
134. Id. at 979.
135. Smith, supra note 19, at 266.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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workplace, he would be acting in his capacity as an employee, and his speech
would then be balanced under Pickering.138
Mary Rose Papandrea, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of North Carolina School of Law, also criticized reliance on the Connick “threshold question,” arguing that it “undermines” the constitutional
rights of public school teachers.139 She would entirely abandon the Pickering/Connick framework, on grounds that it allows school districts too much
latitude to discipline teachers without having to prove that the speech interfered with school business.140 Associate Dean Papandrea called for presumptive First Amendment protection for private teacher speech unless the school
district can demonstrate a substantial “nexus” between the speech and teacher
job effectiveness.141
One scholar has warned that any expressive content posted by a public
educator that does not touch on a matter of public concern only has to reach
the wrong parent, student, or school board member to become a jobthreatening event.142 In a 2010 article in the University of Dayton Law Review, Patricia Niddifer suggested that it is unreasonable for a teacher to face
adverse work consequences as a result of posting content that, while not
touching on a public concern, may be neither broadly offensive nor inappropriate.143 The author advocated abandoning Connick in favor of a modified
Pickering balancing test in which the teacher’s First Amendment interests are
balanced against the State’s rights as an educator rather than employer.144
That same year, an article in the Valparaiso University Law Review contained
a proposal for examining the online speech of teachers that involved placing
the content of the speech along a continuum, with purely private speech on
one end, political or social speech in the middle, and speech relating to employment on the other end.145 According to the article, if the speech is purely
private, then the speaker will always be acting as a private citizen and should
therefore be protected completely by the First Amendment.146
The proposals these scholars advance are thought-provoking and would
advance the speech rights of public educators. But, the majority of these proposals likely tip the scales too far in the direction of the employee, not giving
adequate consideration to the level of disruption the employer might suffer.
This is particularly true in sensitive environments such as public education
and law enforcement. Even when speaking in the capacity of a private citizen
on matters of public concern, a public educator who engages in expression
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 266–67.
Papandrea, supra note 19, at 1634.
Id. at 1630.
Id.
Nidiffer, supra note 19, at 135.
Id.
Id. at 136.
Akiti, supra note 19, at 161.
Id. at 163.
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that reasonably calls into question his judgment, decision-making ability, or
general commitment to treating students with fairness can have a tremendous
negative impact on the school community.
The broadly expressed concern of these scholars – that courts would rely
on Connick to effectively exclude educators from First Amendment protection whenever they engage in online expressive activity – certainly seems
justified. But as litigation involving public educators and social media has
increased over the last ten years, it is worth considering whether these fears
have been realized. Has Connick, in fact, stripped public educators of First
Amendment protection for social media expression?

IV. FEDERAL CASES INVOLVING INTERNET-BASED EMPLOYEE
SPEECH
This section focuses on recent federal cases that deal specifically with
public employee speech disseminated via social media or other Internet-based
forms of communication. It first reviews four decisions from the federal
courts of appeals and then focuses on a sampling of illustrative cases from
various federal district courts. In the discussion of these cases, a number of
trends will emerge regarding both the application of the Connick public concern/private interest test, as well as the Pickering balancing test.

A. Circuit Courts
Four federal circuits have decided cases dealing with public employees
and Internet-based expression. The Connick public concern/private interest
test was not decisive in any of the cases. Instead, each case turned on the
analysis of the employee speech under Pickering, which led to the employee
prevailing in only one of the four cases.
The first of these cases came in the summer of 2009, when the Ninth
Circuit decided the case of Tara Richerson, a curriculum specialist and instructional coach at Central Kitsap School District in Washington State.147
Richerson published a blog in which she made personally insulting remarks
about her supervisors and colleagues.148 There were numerous complaints
regarding Richerson’s blog, including one from a teacher Richerson
coached.149 As a result, the human resources director reassigned Richerson
from coaching back into a teaching role.150 Richerson claimed that she had
been retaliated against in violation of her First Amendment rights.151 The

147. Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009), amended (Aug.
27, 2009).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.152
The Ninth Circuit bypassed the Connick threshold question by assuming, without deciding, that some of Richerson’s speech was related to a matter of public concern.153 Richerson’s speech, however, could not survive
scrutiny under Pickering.154 The court specifically looked at whether Richerson’s blog was disruptive to relationships in the workplace, particularly those
“premised on personal loyalty and confidentiality.”155 Additionally, the court
analyzed whether the blog interfered with Richerson’s effectiveness in her
role.156 “It is abundantly clear from undisputed evidence in the record,” the
court concluded, “that Richerson’s speech had a significantly deleterious
effect in each of these ways.”157 Because her role as an instructional coach
relied upon personal relationships and several teachers refused to work with
her in the wake of her blog, the Ninth Circuit determined her speech was sufficiently disruptive to justify the transfer.158
In 2013, the Fourth Circuit decided Bland v. Roberts, becoming the first
court of appeals to decide a case dealing specifically with public employee
speech and social media.159 B.J. Roberts, the sheriff of Hampton, Virginia,
won re-election and subsequently decided not to reappoint eight employees.160 Two of the employees, Daniel Ray Carter and Robert McCoy, had
engaged in expressive activities on social media and argued that Roberts was
illegally motivated to fire them after they had supported his opponent, Jim
Adams. 161
Carter and McCoy were both deputy sheriffs in Hampton.162 After Adams announced his candidacy, Carter visited and “liked” the Adams campaign Facebook page.163 In addition, he posted a brief comment of support.164 McCoy posted a similar message of support on the Adams page.165
When Roberts became aware of the two men’s social media support of Adams’s candidacy, he made general statements warning employees that publicly supporting Adams would be grounds for termination.166 At one point,
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 2013), amended (Sept. 23,

2013).
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id. at 372–73.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 381.
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Roberts angrily confronted Carter: “You made your bed, and now you’re
going to lie in it – after the election, you’re gone.”167 The sheriff argued, and
the district court agreed, that when Carter “liked” the Adams campaign page,
it was not “speech” for the purposes of the First Amendment.168 The court of
appeals disagreed, suggesting that “[o]nce one understands the nature of what
Carter did by liking the Campaign Page, it becomes apparent that his conduct
qualifies as speech.”169 The court continued: “In the context of a political
campaign’s Facebook page, the meaning that the user approves of the candidacy whose page is being liked is unmistakable.”170 Then, the court turned to
the Connick public/private threshold question and determined that Carter and
McCoy had both spoken on a matter inherently linked to public concern –
politics.171 Because the sheriff failed to show that Carter and McCoy had
caused disruption through their speech, the balancing test under Pickering
tipped toward the two employees.172
Later in 2013, the Seventh Circuit decided the case of Bryan Craig, a
high school guidance counselor and girls basketball coach whose selfpublished book raised red flags for his employer.173 Craig was a tenured employee at Rich Central High School in Chicago’s southern suburban area.174
His 2012 book, It’s Her Fault, was purportedly a “self-help” book for women
interested in improving their romantic relationships.175 Craig’s thesis was
that women act based upon emotion rather than intellect.176 He advised female readers that, in order to shift the balance of power toward them in their
relationships, they should use sex to control men’s behavior.177 He also advised women to be sexually submissive in order to make their men “feel” as
if they had power in the relationship.178 The book was replete with explicit
discussion of sexual topics, including a “comparative analysis of the female
genitalia of various races,” which went “into an excruciating degree of graphic detail.”179

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 386.
Id.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir.
2013). This case did not involve social media or Internet communication, per se. See
id. But like blogging and social media, the practice of self-publishing utilizes technology to allow individuals to more easily make their unfiltered writing broadly
available to the public. It is, therefore, a case that has relevance to this study.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1114.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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In the introduction and throughout the book, Craig referenced his employment at Rich Central High School and, specifically, his experience as a
counselor to bolster his qualifications for giving relationship advice.180 When
the district learned of It’s Her Fault, it terminated Craig’s employment.181
The board cited “disruption, concern, distrust and confusion” within the
community.182 The board also alleged that Craig’s conduct had created “an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational environment,” and that he had
“failed to present [himself as] a positive role model and failed to properly
comport himself in accordance with his professional obligations as a public
teacher.”183
Craig filed suit in federal court, claiming a First Amendment violation,
but the district court granted summary judgment for the school district, holding that It’s Her Fault did not touch on a matter of public concern.184 In doing so, the district court relied heavily on City of San Diego v. Roe, and, in
fact, deemed that It’s Her Fault was substantially similar to Roe’s policethemed adult videos, a proposition that the Seventh Circuit dismissed on appeal.185 “Whatever one may think of Craig’s book,” the court explained, “it
is fundamentally different in character from the ‘debased parody’ at issue in
Roe.”186 It’s Her Fault, while provocative, at least addressed “the structure of
adult relationships, an issue with which some segment of the public would be
interested.”187 In the court’s view, the dynamics of adult relationships was an
overall topic of public interest, and therefore, Craig’s book progressed to the
balancing test under Pickering.188
Interestingly, the court pointed out that the circumstances in the case did
not really merit consideration of Connick because the public/private question
was designed to evaluate speech only in cases where “a public employee
speaks out about her employer’s policies, conduct, or other issues more directly related to her public employment.”189 Put another way, the exercise of
analyzing the public or private nature of the content of an employee’s speech
was merely a method to help courts distinguish between an employee’s
“purely personal gripe,” which is unprotected, and a citizen’s attempt to “notify the public of a work-related issue about which the public is concerned,”
which is protected.190

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 1114–15.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 1117–18.
Id. at 1117 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 81–82 (2004)
(per curiam)).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1117–18.
189. Id. at 1116 n.2.
190. Id.
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Though Craig’s speech did qualify as touching on matters of public concern, the school district prevailed in the balancing test, and his termination
was upheld.191 The court found it reasonable to predict that students and parents would ultimately become aware of It’s Her Fault and that this would
impact Craig’s ability to function effectively in his job.192 “Knowing Craig’s
tendency to objectify women,” the court reasoned, “defendants could reasonably anticipate that some female students would feel uncomfortable reaching
out to Craig for advice.”193 The court went even further, suggesting “some
students may forego receiving the school’s counseling services entirely rather
than take the risk that Craig would not view them as a person but instead as
an object.”194
The most recent appellate case dealing with an educator and Internetbased speech came out of the Third Circuit in 2015. Natalie Munroe was a
tenured English teacher at Central Bucks East High School in Doylestown,
Pennsylvania.195 Between August of 2014 and November of 2015, Munroe
made eighty-four entries on her blog, mostly discussing various areas of personal interest, such as yoga, food, movies, and her own children.196 In select
posts, however, she commented on her students and co-workers.197 In October of 2009, Munroe wrote about her students, calling them “rude, disengaged, lazy whiners.”198 In January of 2010, Munroe mused about comments
she would like to enter on a student’s report card, such as “[f]rightfully dim,”
“[l]azy asshole,” “argumentative fuck,” and “[u]tterly loathsome in all imaginable ways.”199
Students discovered the blog and began discussing it via social media.200
The school became aware of Munroe’s blog in February of 2011 after a local
newspaper began raising questions.201 The principal, Abram Lucabaugh,
confronted Munroe about the blog and immediately suspended her with
pay.202 Lucabaugh described the fallout from the blog as a “ticking time
bomb” and reported that angry students were distributing printed copies of
the blog entries in the hallways.203 Ultimately, over 200 parents contacted the
school, requesting that their children not be placed in Munroe’s class.204

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1119–20.
Id. at 1120.
Id.
Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 457–58 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 459–60.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 461–62.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id.
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On March 1, Munroe went on maternity leave, which had been scheduled prior to the district learning of her blog.205 Between her paid suspension
and maternity leave, Munroe was out for the remainder of the school year,
while the district deliberated over the constitutional implications of terminating her employment.206 Munroe returned to work in August of 2011 for the
new school year.207 She was placed on a highly prescriptive growth plan,
including a requirement that she complete lesson plans she believed were, by
design, impossible to complete accurately.208 At the year’s end, her supervisor gave her an unsatisfactory evaluation, and the district terminated her employment.209 Munroe challenged the decision in federal court, alleging that
the district had retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment
rights.210 The district court granted summary judgment for the school district,
and Munroe appealed to the Third Circuit.211
The Third Circuit focused on the public concern/private interest question presented in Connick.212 While the vast majority of her blog posts were
related to private interests, the court acknowledged the district court’s finding
that Munroe did occasionally write on matters that might be of public concern, such as “academic integrity, the value of honor, and students’ lack of
effort.”213 The court also recognized that Munroe only addressed these topics
incidentally, while focusing primarily on her personal reactions to “negative
interactions between herself and her students.”214 Munroe used the extensive
media coverage to touch more deeply on the larger areas of public interest she
mentioned in her blog. “We reluctantly assume for the purposes of this opinion that Munroe’s speech satisfied the ‘public concern’ requirement,” wrote
the court.215
After concluding that Munroe’s blog posts dealt with a public concern,
Circuit Judge Cowan turned to the balancing test under Pickering.216 The
“opprobrious” tone of Munroe’s blog posts was a dispositive factor in their
failure to survive balancing under Pickering.217 The court reasoned that “invective directed against the very persons that the governmental agency is
meant to serve could be expected to have serious consequences for the per-

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 463.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 464.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 467–69.
Id. at 468 (quoting Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 34 F. Supp. 3d 532,
537 (E.D. Pa. 2014)).
214. Id. (quoting Munroe, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 537–38).
215. Id. at 470.
216. Id. at 472.
217. Id. at 473.
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formance of the speaker’s duties and the agency’s regular operations.”218 But
the court also noted that more elevated speech would be much less likely to
“impair discipline or employee harmony” or otherwise cause a disruption.219

B. District Courts
Because the technological advances in communication have largely
happened within the last ten years, there has been a limited number of cases
involving Internet-based speech and public employees in the lower federal
courts, although the number has increased in recent years. In some of the
earliest cases, such as Spanierman v. Hughes and Snyder v. Millersville University, the courts relied on the Connick public concern/private interest test to
disqualify teacher social media activity from First Amendment protection.220
In more recent cases, federal courts have seemed more likely to hold (or at
least assume) that public employee speech addresses matters of public concern.221 This section provides a sample of several recent lower court decisions.222
In 2011, a federal district court heard the first case involving a public
employee’s Facebook post.223 A federal district court in Arkansas held in
favor of Dana Mattingly, who was fired from her job in the circuit clerk’s
office in Saline County, Arkansas, after making a Facebook post in which she
expressed sympathy for her terminated co-workers.224 Dennis Milligan had
been elected Saline County Circuit Clerk in 2010.225 On December 27, 2010,
Milligan dismissed four of the nine employees within the circuit clerk’s office.226 According to Mattingly, at least two of the four terminated employees had supported Milligan’s political opponent.227 Later that evening, Mattingly posted the following comment on her Facebook page: “[M]y heart goes
out to the ladies in my office that were told by letter they were no longer

218. Id. at 474.
219. Id.
220. See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297–98 (D. Conn. 2008);

Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07–1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943, at *39–43
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
221. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637 (9th Cir. 2009), amended (Aug.
27, 2009); Munroe, 805 F.3d at 458; Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 387 (4th Cir.
2013), amended (Sept. 23, 2013); Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d
1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 2013).
222. Ten district court cases were reviewed for this Article; five are included in
the discussion, and all ten are summarized in Table 1 on page 86.
223. Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
126665, at *4–5 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011).
224. Id. at *8.
225. Id. at *1.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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needed ... It’s sad.”228 The post elicited expressions of both anger and concern from a number of Mattingly’s 1300 Facebook friends.229 According to
Milligan, he received multiple critical phone calls from anonymous callers at
his home that evening.230 Ultimately, the controversy attracted the attention
of local media.231
The following day, Milligan fired Mattingly via telephone.232 He later
sent written notification, citing the fallout from her comments that were made
“in a public domain.”233 Mattingly filed suit in federal court, claiming her
First Amendment speech rights had been violated.234 In court, Milligan argued that Mattingly’s motive in posting her comment was the purely personal
concern of eliciting “affirmation and support” from her Facebook friends and
should not be protected.235 The court answered that, even if Mattingly’s motives were personal, “the fact remains that she did not make them as an employee but as a citizen.”236 The form of her speech (the “public domain” of
Facebook), as well as the fact that local media had expressed interest in the
story, suggested to the court that the matter was of public concern.237 Under
the Pickering balancing test, Milligan could not produce ample evidence that
Mattingly’s Facebook post had any disruptive impact on the efficacy of the
circuit clerk’s office, so she prevailed on her First Amendment claim.238
The Mattlingly case is informative in several respects. First, it is an example of a case in which the form of the expression (a public Facebook post
to over 1300 friends) was a distinct factor the judge weighed in holding that
the speech touched on a matter of public concern. Second, it illustrates how
speech attracting media attention can influence a judge’s determination that
the speech touched on an inherently public concern. Third, the case underscores the importance of employers documenting any workplace disturbance
that might result from employee speech. This lack of evidence was the reason that Mattingly’s speech claim was able to withstand the scrutiny of the
Pickering test.239
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, in early
2014, issued a ruling in Duke v. Hamil, a case dealing with a police officer
who posted an image of the Confederate flag.240 Rex Duke was the Deputy
Chief of Police at the Clayton State University (“CSU”) Police Department
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at *2 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
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near Atlanta, Georgia.241 Duke had thirty-plus years of experience and a
clean record of service when, in November of 2012, he posted an image of
the flag, along with the comment, “It’s time for the second revolution,” on his
Facebook page.242 Duke’s posting came in the aftermath of the 2012 presidential election as an expression of “general dissatisfaction with Washington
politicians.”243 The post came to the attention of an Atlanta television station,
and the department began receiving complaints regarding the matter.244 After
an investigation, Duke was demoted from the position of deputy chief to an
undesirable morning patrol duty typically reserved for inexperienced officers,
which resulted in a $15,000 cut in annual pay.245
Duke filed a lawsuit against the CSU Chief of Police, Bobby Hamil,
claiming that Hamil had violated his First Amendment rights by demoting
him in retaliation for “privately advocating for his personal political beliefs.”246 “[B]ecause it expressed disapproval of elected officials,” the court
reasoned that Duke’s post dealt with a topic of importance to an informed
electorate.247 Therefore, it easily passed the “public concern” requirement of
Connick.248 The court then turned to the balancing test under Pickering,
where Duke’s speech failed decisively.249 Holding in Hamil’s favor, Judge
Richard Story explained that the post could convey messages that were more
troubling than simple disapproval of Washington politicians.250 “Many of
these messages are controversial, divisive, and prejudicial to say the least,”
explained Judge Story.251 Because Duke was second-in-command, the court
viewed it as reasonable to foresee a negative impact on the “discipline, mutual respect, or trust” among those who Duke supervised.252 Further, Duke’s
speech conveyed ideas that might undermine the department’s reputation, as
well as the public trust.253 “[M]any in the community would take offense to
his chosen form of speech,” Judge Story argued, “not just because they disapprove of it, but because it raises concerns of Plaintiff’s prejudice – and the
Department’s.”254
The court believed the racial overtones of Duke’s post raised serious
questions regarding Duke’s ability to treat all members of the community he
served in a fair manner, regardless of their race or ethnicity. This rationale
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1294.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1300.
Id.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1301.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1302.
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could easily be applied to a teacher or school administrator who posts images
or remarks online that could be viewed as racially inflammatory. Because it
is critical for parents and students to perceive that school employees are making decisions that impact them in a just and ethical manner, this type of expressive behavior seems highly likely to damage an educator’s effectiveness.
An example of how racially insensitive remarks can provide grounds for
dismissal in an educational setting occurred in 2015, when a federal district
court ruled against Mary Czaplinski, a school security guard in Vineland,
New Jersey, after she announced on Facebook that she was “praying hard”
for a Philadelphia police officer who was shot and killed in the line of duty by
“another black thug.”255 Her post also included the exhortation that “white
people should start riots and protests.”256 Czaplinski attempted to temper her
comments a day later, commenting that “there are thugs of every race,” but it
was already too late.257 By the end of the day, her post had been anonymously forwarded to the superintendent of Vineland schools.258
Czaplinski was immediately suspended, and within a week, the district
held a hearing and terminated her.259 In the letter informing her of her termination, the district stated the following:
School personnel are entrusted to use training, judgment, and commitment to fairness to diffuse, resolve and/or appropriately react to
disputes, rules violations, safety concerns, and other day-to-day events
which might otherwise compromise student learning and school climate. . . . Your pronouncement has greatly jeopardized your ability to
effectively conduct the business of public school safety and security
because it reasonably calls into question the basis of your decisionmaking.260

Czaplinski sought an injunction against her termination on the basis that it
violated her First Amendment right to free speech.261 In denying her request,
the court acknowledged that she was speaking in the capacity of a private
citizen on a matter of public concern but found that her First Amendment
claim was unlikely to succeed because, as the school district had aptly pointed out in the letter of termination, her comment could “reasonably be presumed to impede her proper performance of her daily duties as a security
guard.”262

255. Czaplinski v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Vineland, No. 15-2045 (JEI/JS), 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38349, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2015).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at *3.
259. Id. at *3–4.
260. Id. at *4–5.
261. Id. at *1.
262. Id. at *9–10.
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In September of 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia decided the case of Liverman v. City of Petersburg. This case is
particularly interesting because it dealt with two police officers who were
disciplined over an exchange on social media, and only one of the two was
able to prevail on his First Amendment claim.263 Herbert Liverman and
Vance Richards were veteran officers in the Petersburg Police Department in
Virginia.264 In the summer of 2013, Liverman commented on his personal
Facebook page about what he perceived as inexperienced and under-qualified
officers being promoted to leadership positions in law enforcement.265 He
emphasized the safety-related concerns of placing inexperienced officers in
specialty units or as instructors.266 He cited a 2006 FBI report to support his
claims.267 The post was “liked” by over thirty of Liverman’s contacts, many
of whom were department employees.268 Liverman’s post also prompted
numerous comments, one of which was Richards’s.269
Richards voiced his support of Liverman and alluded to a specific example of someone who had received what he considered to be an undeserving
promotion: “[Y]ou know who I’m talking about . . . How can ANYONE look
up, or give respect to a SGT in Patrol with ONLY 1 1/2 years experience in
the street? Or less as a matter of fact.”270 Liverman responded to Richards’s
comment by stating: “There used to be a time when you had to earn a promotion or a spot in a specialty unit . . . but now it seems as though anything goes
and beyond officer safety and questions of liability, these positions have been
‘devalued.’”271 Richards then added “[y]our Agency is only as good as it’s
[sic] Leader(s) . . . It’s hard to ‘lead by example’ when there isn’t one . . .
smh.”272
After an employee brought the posts to the department’s attention, the
two officers were investigated and ultimately disciplined for violating the
department’s social media policy.273 Both officers were returned to “probationary status,” which excluded them from promotion eligibility.274 The men
sought relief in federal court, claiming the department’s social media policy
violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.275
263. Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 106 F. Supp. 3d 744 (E.D. Va. 2015), affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, 844 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 2016).
264. Id. at 750.
265. Id. at 750–51.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 752.
269. Id. at 751.
270. Id. (second alteration in original).
271. Id. (alteration in original).
272. Id. (third alteration in original). Note that “smh” is an abbreviation meaning
“shaking my head.”
273. Id. at 752.
274. Id. at 753.
275. Id. at 754.
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District Judge James Spencer analyzed the comments each officer made
individually and determined that, while Liverman had commented as a citizen
on matters of public concern, Richards had only spoken in his capacity as an
employee on matters of personal interest.276 “Liverman was participating in
or propelling a debate over public safety as a ‘member of a community most
likely to have informed and definite opinions,’” wrote Judge Spencer.277
Richards’s comments, on the other hand, “pertained to personal grievances
and complaints about conditions of employment rather than broad matters.”278 After finding that Liverman’s speech was protected, the court then
turned to the balancing test under Pickering. Because the police department
had not presented sufficient evidence to suggest that Liverman’s comments
had harmed the department, or had the reasonable potential to do so, the balancing test leaned in Liverman’s favor.279
In October of 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
West Virginia decided Austin v. Preston County Commission.280 Courtney
Austin was the Director of the Preston County Animal Shelter and administered a Facebook page for the shelter within the auspices of her own personal
Facebook account.281 Between February of 2012 and January of 2013, Austin
was disciplined on two separate occasions for content that she had posted on
the shelter’s page.282 The first post celebrated the shelter having gone sixty
days without euthanizing an animal and urged citizens to like the post to support a no-kill facility.283 The second included a complaint about alleged loss
of heat and water at the shelter during cold weather, which prompted a number of incoming phone calls to commissioners from citizens who were concerned about the animals’ welfare.284
After the second post, members of the commission stipulated that Austin
should not post anything on the page without the approval of at least two
commissioners.285 The commission also requested access to the Facebook
page, a request Austin declined because the page was created from within her
personal Facebook page.286 The commissioners and Austin discussed simply
closing the page and starting a new one but decided against it because the
page was already established within the community.287 An ITS employee
276. Id. at 759–60.
277. Id. at 758 (alteration omitted) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.

563, 572 (1968)).
278. Id. at 759.
279. Id. at 765.
280. Austin v. Preston Cty. Comm’n, No. 1:13CV135, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
146041 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 14, 2014).
281. Id. at *3.
282. Id. at *4, *7–8.
283. Id. at *3–4.
284. Id. at *4–5.
285. Id. at *6.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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was directed to find a way to grant the commissioners access to the page
without compromising Austin’s personal Facebook privacy.288 Eventually,
the commissioners directed Austin to change her password.289 However,
rather than complying, Austin unilaterally decided to shut the page down.290
Within a week after Austin’s deletion of the Facebook page, the commission
voted unanimously to terminate her employment.291
Austin challenged her dismissal in federal court as illegal retaliation for
her exercise of speech protected by the First Amendment.292 The court relied
on a broad reading of Garcetti in ruling against her.293 “An employee may
still be acting ‘pursuant to official duties,’” the court argued, “even if she
engages in speech that is not part of her official job duties so long as it is in
furtherance of such job duties.”294 Though Austin’s official job duties did not
include maintaining a shelter Facebook page, and indeed the page was established and maintained through her own personal page, the court felt that,
when posting on the shelter page, Austin was acting pursuant to job duties.295
She did not use the page for personal communication, only for shelter business.296 The page was titled Preston County Animal Shelter, and Austin posted in that name as opposed to her own.297 The shelter’s Facebook page was
listed in shelter information as its official website.298 All of this led the court
to conclude that Austin was speaking in the capacity of an employee “pursuant to her job duties,” and, as such, had no claim under the First Amendment.299
This decision is significant because it is the only case reviewed in which
employee speech was disqualified from First Amendment protection because
of the Garcetti standard. Because school employees often maintain websites
for classes or school programs such as band or orchestra, it is possible that
such online speech could be considered pursuant to job duties, although
school administrators should be cautious.300

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *13–16.
Id. at *15–16 (quoting Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir.

2010)).
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at *17.
Id. at *16.
Id.
Id. at *16–17.
Id. at *19.
See, e.g., Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297–98 (D. Conn.
2008) (when a teacher set up a class MySpace page, the court did not view his speech
as “pursuant to job duties” because he used the site to communicate with students
about personal matters as well as school matters).
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In sum, this section has highlighted the way in which federal district and
circuit courts have applied existing precedent regarding the First Amendment
speech rights of public employees in cases dealing specifically with Internetbased expression. In reviewing these cases, there are lessons to be learned.
The following section draws upon these lessons in order to outline a process
that will enable public school administrators to analyze controversial employee speech that has gone viral and make decisions that are legally and ethically
defensible.

V. PROPOSAL
In Connick, Justice White created a threshold to Pickering designed to
protect public employers from what he viewed as an unreasonable burden of
having to defend the constitutionality of routine employment decisions.301
Extending the Connick test to public employee speech that is completely unrelated to the workplace seems not only out of line with Justice White’s intent, but also of limited utility. In Connick, the content and capacity variables
were presented as if they were perfectly correlated. That is, “employee
speech” is explicitly linked with “private interests” and “citizen speech” with
“public concerns.” But when a public educator posts social media content, he
is frequently acting in the capacity of a citizen, while still communicating on
a matter of private interest – a combination that the test was not designed to
evaluate. This limited utility may explain why one circuit court simply assumed that speech met the Connick public concern requirement and relied on
the Pickering test to evaluate cases involving the online speech of educators
and other public employees.302 Twelve of the sixteen employees in the cases
reviewed lost their free speech claims, but only three of them had their speech
disqualified under Connick. When employees did win these cases, it was
only because their employers failed to show a disruption under Pickering.
The implication for school administrators is clear: it is not prudent to pursue
negative employment action against an employee without first assessing evidence of any adverse impact the speech may have had on institutional efficacy.
It does not impose an unreasonable burden to require a public school
administrator to consider whether an employee’s private speech has adversely
impacted school operations when considering negative employment action.
Because the concept of disruption is so expansively defined in Pickering, the
balance will generally favor the employer in cases where an employee’s
301. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
302. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009), amended

(Aug. 27, 2009). Although twelve of sixteen employees in the cases reviewed lost
their free speech claims, only three had their speech disqualified under Connick.
When public employers discipline their employees because of their online expressive
activity, the courts are generally supportive, as long as the employer can show evidence of some type of workplace disruption.
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speech has truly caused problems, even if it is unrelated to work.303 Pickering allows public employers to punish employees for speech that interrupts
office routines, distracts workers, damages workplace relationships, or
demonstrates disloyalty or incompetence.304 But when a public employee
engages in private speech that does not meet the broad definition of “disruptive,” as set forth in Pickering, then how can an employer ethically justify
adverse action?
Clearly, public school administrators need a new framework to guide
them in implementing legally defensible personnel decisions regarding educator online speech. The following proposal is a step-by-step decisionmaking model for administrators that will serve to broaden, define, and protect educator speech rights in the age of the Internet. Yet it will still safeguard the state’s legitimate interest in institutional efficacy. The framework
requires a balanced examination of both content and capacity variables and is
based on philosophical assumptions that acknowledge the complex relationship between those variables. Most importantly, the model comports with
and does not require abandoning any black letter law.

A. The New Threshold Question
With Garcetti, the Court introduced the question of whether public employee speech occurs pursuant to job duties.305 In doing so, the Court developed a new “threshold” question – one that is more narrowly constructed than
the Connick public/private dichotomy. This query becomes the first step in
the new framework: was the speech made pursuant to job duties? If not, then
it passes to the next stage of the analysis. If the speech was made pursuant to
job duties, then it is unprotected.306
When principals specifically direct teachers to communicate with students or parents via social media sites, the exchanges would likely be pursuant to job duties. Even when an employee acts upon his own initiative, his
social media activity could be considered “pursuant to job duties” in some
cases. For example, a high school band director who creates a band page on
Facebook to communicate with students and parents regarding band activities
would likely be acting in furtherance of his job duties. The West Virginia
case of Austin v. Preston County Commission provides an example of an employee who, at her own initiative, established and maintained the County
Animal Shelter Facebook page. She posted on the page as “Preston County
303.
304.
305.
306.

Smith, supra note 19, at 252.
Id.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).
Whether speech can be considered “pursuant to job duties” is a difficult
question and requires school administrators to be aware of their state whistle-blower
laws, as well as any holdings within their circuits regarding academic freedom at the
pre-kindergarten level. Only one of the cases reviewed in this Article featured a holding that an educator had engaged in online speech that was considered “pursuant to
job duties,” so a cautious approach is advised.
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Animal Shelter,” exclusively regarding shelter business. Thus, her expressive
activity on the page fell within the scope of her duties as shelter director.307
Different circumstances, however, will produce different results, and when
unsure, employers should err conservatively and assume that the speech was
not pursuant to job duties, thus allowing it to move to step two of the test.

B. Is the Speech of Inherent Public Concern?
In the second step in the new test, we consider the public concern/private interest threshold test from Connick, but only as a vehicle to help
us identify whether an employee is speaking in his “citizen capacity.” The
Supreme Court, in City of San Diego v. Roe, attempted to clarify the public/private dichotomy by declaring that in order for speech to qualify as a
matter of public concern, it must be “something that is a subject of legitimate
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to
the public at the time of publication.”308 The First, Second, and Third Circuits have agreed in O’Connor, Cioffi, and Azzaro, respectively, that speech
that adds value to the process of self-governance and citizens’ ability to make
informed decisions regarding their government is inherently of public concern.309
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that the personal motivation of
a speaker should not detract from the inherent public concern of the content.310 A public employee (not speaking pursuant to job duties) who speaks
out on a matter of public concern is automatically functioning, at least partially, in his capacity as a citizen, and his rights should be balanced appropriately
against the state’s interests. Therefore, if it is determined that the content of
the speech itself at least touches partially on a matter of inherent public concern, then it should advance to step four of the test, analysis under Pickering.
If the speech does not even partially touch on a public concern, the analysis
advances to step three, where there is no assumption that the speaker is acting
as a citizen. When speaking solely on private interests, the employee may be
speaking either in the capacity of a citizen, an employee, or in a mixed capacity.

307. Austin v. Preston Cty. Comm’n, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146041, at *16
(N.D. W. Va. Oct. 14, 2014).
308. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam).
309. O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 913–14 (1st Cir. 1993); Cioffi v. Averill
Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2006); Azzaro v. Cty.
of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 977–78 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
310. See Banks v. Wolfe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d. 888, 894 (6th Cir. 2003);
Sullivan v. Ramirez, 360 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2004).
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C. Private Concern Speech: Determining Capacity
If speech was not made pursuant to job duties and does not touch on a
matter of inherent public concern, then it must be private interest speech. In
this step of the process, the speaker’s capacity is the primary consideration
because an employee speaking on private interests might be speaking as a
citizen, as an employee, or in a mixed capacity. It is important to note the
contours of what it means to be functioning in the capacity of an employee
versus the capacity as a citizen. Not everything said by an employee during
the course of the workday constitutes “employee” speech. State employees
who engage in private and personal conversations during the course of the
workday would very likely be speaking in their capacities as private citizens
and not employees. Justice Powell touched on this in his concurrence in
Rankin v. McPherson, where he highlighted the private nature of McPherson’s conversation with her boyfriend, even though the conversation occurred
at work and during work hours.311 Justice Powell attached importance to the
fact that McPherson lacked any intent or expectation that her private comment to her boyfriend would ever be shared or acted upon by someone
else.312
Conversely, public employees engaging in expressive activities outside of work and off duty may still be acting in an employee capacity in certain circumstances. For the purposes of this framework, even when not
speaking on matters directly related to his employment, if an educator seeks
to link his expression to his professional life, he may be functioning in the
capacity of an employee and not as a citizen. City of San Diego v. Roe is
illustrative in this regard. The Court noted that Roe had “t[aken] deliberate
steps to link his videos and other wares to his police work, all in a way injurious to his employer.”313 Roe’s identity as a police officer was integral to the
central message of his speech. Though he was not acting pursuant to job
duties, the steps he took to link the content of his speech to his status as a
police officer caused him to cross over into the capacity of a police officer.
In Craig v. Rich Township High School District 227, the Fourth Circuit took
into account that Bryan Craig had repeatedly referenced his counseling activities at Rich Central High School to bolster his credentials as a relationship
expert.314
In analyzing whether private interest speech is spoken from the capacity
of an employee, one must consider the content, form, and context to discover
any nexus between the employee speech and the workplace. The following
questions may be helpful:

311.
312.
313.
314.

Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 393 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring).
Id.
City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 81.
Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 1110, 1114–15 (7th Cir.

2013).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

33

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 7

84

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82



Did the speaker make attempts to present himself as a school/district
employee or as a professional educator in general?



Did the speaker take steps to make it more likely that members of the
school community (students/parents/colleagues/administrators) were
exposed to his speech?



Did the speaker gain (or seek to gain) greater authority/credibility for
readers/listeners by virtue of his professional experience or employment?



Did the speaker’s expression contain information to which he would
not otherwise have had access if not for his status as an employee?



Did the speaker express himself on a matter that pertained directly to
his work or employer?

If there is an affirmative answer to one or more of these questions, then an
argument can be made that the speaker was acting within his capacity as an
employee. His expression would qualify as employee speech on a matter of
private concern, unprotected under Connick and therefore not eligible for the
Pickering balancing test. This type of speech would include complaints
about the job or working conditions that do not rise to the level of public concern. This might also include speech about superiors, colleagues, or students
that a school administrator may find objectionable, so long as it does not rise
to a level of public concern.
If the preceding questions produce only negative answers, then the employee’s “private” speech was likely made in his capacity as a private citizen.
Even though this speech touches on a matter of private interest, it should be
afforded First Amendment protection subject to the Pickering balancing test.
Trust, confidence, and respect from students and parents within the community are essential if an educator is to function effectively in the job. When educator speech undermines that trust, it is likely to erode his effectiveness as an
educator, and in turn, damage institutional efficacy. Further, because educators work with children who may be easily influenced, the role-modeling
function of the job is a critical consideration. Even purely private speech, if
seen or heard by parents or students, could substantially disrupt school or
employee functions. For these reasons, at least in the case of the public educator, even purely private speech should be subjected to balancing under
Pickering.

D. The Pickering Balancing Questions
Step four of the process involves analyzing the speech under Pickering.
Any speech made by an educator in the capacity as a citizen, whether on a
public concern or a private interest, should be balanced under Pickering. The
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Pickering balancing questions (see Table 2 on page 89) are a set of considerations that would allow school administrators to effectively balance their interests as employers and educators against the employees’ First Amendment
rights. The questions offer school administrators a concrete template for considering the impact of a specific employee speech sample on institutional
efficacy. Affirmative answers to any of these questions suggest that a school
district would be justified in taking adverse employment action against an
employee. If a school administrator cannot answer at least one of the Pickering questions affirmatively, then the employee’s speech should not provide
the basis for a negative employment decision.
The case review suggests that, at least in the educational setting, speech
that could be categorized as racist or sexist is not only likely to cause the
community to question the fitness of the employee to continue to function
effectively in the job, but is also likely to actually impair the ability of the
employee to perform effectively.315 Further, an employee who disparages
supervisors, students, or colleagues online may damage working relationships
to the point that he can no longer be effective in his job.316
In review, the proposed model involves four essential steps. The first
step is determining whether the speech was uttered pursuant to the educator’s
job duties, rendering it ineligible for First Amendment protection. If the
speech was not pursuant to job duties, then the analysis proceeds to step two,
which is determining whether the speech touched on an inherent public concern. If so, then the speaker was acting in the capacity of a private citizen and
is protected by the First Amendment and would advance to step four – the
Pickering questions. If not, then we proceed to the third step, in which we
evaluate whether or not the speaker acted in his capacity as an employee
when he spoke. If so, then the speech is employee speech on a matter of private interest and is not protected. If not, then it is protected private citizen
speech that will be evaluated under Pickering. The model will require school
administrators to evaluate whether or not the employee’s speech has disrupted institutional efficacy, but this will not be an onerous task. The time and
consideration required seems to be nothing more than what a fair-minded
employer should be doing anyway. Table 2 on page 89 summarizes the proposed framework.

VI. CONCLUSION
School administrators are caught in a difficult position when one of their
employees engages in controversial speech that goes viral. They must respect
315. See Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1301–02 (N.D. Ga. 2014);
Czaplinksi v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Vineland, No. 15-2045 (JEI/JS), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 38349, at *1–2, *9–10 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2015); Craig, 736 F.3d at 1120.
316. See Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638–39 (9th Cir. 2009), amended (Aug. 27, 2009); Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 475–76 (3d Cir.
2015).
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the First Amendment rights of their employees while still responding to the
needs of the school system and community. The pace of advances in communication technology and the lack of clear Supreme Court precedent make it
difficult for school administrators to walk that fine line. Not only is it confusing to school leaders, but school employees also lack clarity about what is
and is not acceptable in terms of online expressive conduct. Adopting this
approach to evaluating teacher speech cases would provide much needed
clarity for school administrators and teachers alike, as well as a legally defensible framework that would advance teacher expression rights while still recognizing the state’s legitimate interest as both an employer and educator.
This process provides employees with more expansive First Amendment
rights than the existing laws require, particularly in those contextual circuits.
Under the proposed model, (1) an educator who expresses himself as a citizen
would have his speech analyzed under Pickering, even when the expression
does not address a matter of public concern; (2) administrators would retain
broad leeway to discipline employees for disruptive speech; and (3) school
districts would routinely place themselves in more defensible positions.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF FEDERAL CASE LAW ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
AND INTERNET SPEECH
Public
Concern?
Assumed
yes, but
not decided.
Yes.

Pickering Balance
Test
Failed – undermined
workplace relationships and personal
effectiveness.
Failed – invective
directed at students
undermined teacher
effectiveness.

Deputy sheriffs “liked”
and made supportive
comments on Facebook
page of boss’s political
opponent.
High school guidance
counselor and girls coach
self-published sexually
explicit self-help book
for women.

Yes.

Passed – no showing
of disruption within
sheriff’s office.

Yes.

Failed – speech that
objectified females
would
justifiably
erode confidence and
trust in employee as
counselor.

School security guard
posted about “black
thugs” involved in shooting of Philadelphia police
officer.

Yes.

Paramedic commented
on Facebook, disparaging
gun control and liberals.
After being directed to

Yes with
regard to
initial post,
no with

Failed – comment
impeded ability to do
daily
duties/cast
doubt
upon
her
judgment and fairness.
Failed – comment
could
undermine
loyalty,
discipline,
and good working

Case

Speech

Richerson
v. Beckon317

Curriculum
specialist
blogged insulting remarks about supervisors
and colleagues.
Teacher blogged disparaging comments about
students.

Munroe v.
Central
Bucks
School
District318
Bland v.
Roberts319

Craig v.
Rich
Township
High
School
District
227320
Czaplinski
v. Board of
Education
of the City
of Vineland321
Buker v.
Howard
County322

317. Richerson v. Beckon, No. 08-35310, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19327 (9th Cir.
Aug. 27, 2009).
318. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 34 F. Supp. 3d 532 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
319. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013).
320. Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2013).
321. Czaplinski v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Vineland, No. 15-2045 (JEI/JS),
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38349 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2015).
322. Buker v. Howard Cty., No. MJG-13-3046, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68763
(D. Md. May 27, 2015).
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Liverman
v. City of
Petersburg323
Austin v.
Preston
County
Commission324
Duke v.
Hamil325

Vincent v.
Story
County326

Graziosi v.
City of
Greenville327

Mattingly
v. Milligan328

remove comment, he
complained about social
media policy.
Two police officers engaged in Facebook exchange expressing disapproval of promotion procedures.
County animal shelter
director put objectionable
posts on official animal
shelter Facebook page,
refused to give password
to bosses.
Deputy police chief posted rebel flag and called
for second revolution the
morning after President
Obama’s re-election.
Employee in county attorney’s office “liked”
Facebook post that was
highly critical of findings
clearing local police officers in the shooting of a
family member.
Veteran police officer
criticized chief’s decision
not to send representative
to officer funeral in
neighboring city.
Public employee made
sympathetic remark on
Facebook regarding fired
co-workers.

regard to
subsequent
posts.
Liverman,
yes.
Richards,
no.
N/A

Yes.

Yes.

No.

Yes.

[Vol. 82
relationships
department.

within

Passed
(Liverman)
due to lack of evidence of disruption.
N/A (Richards).
N/A

Failed
–
speech
communicated racist
ideology that undermined public trust
and confidence in law
enforcement.
Failed – speech adversely
impacted
working relationships
between county attorney, local police,
and attorney general
offices.
N/A – but would
have failed if speech
had been deemed on
public concern, due
to disruption of working relationships.
Passed – employer
showed no evidence
of disruption.

323. Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 106 F. Supp. 3d 744 (E.D. Va. 2015).
324. Austin v. Preston Cty. Comm’n, No. 1:13CV135, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

146041 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 14, 2014).
325. Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
326. Vincent v. Story Cty., No. 4:12-cv-00157-RAW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
184287 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 14, 2014).
327. Graziosi v. City of Greenville, 985 F. Supp. 2d 808 (N.D. Miss. 2013).
328. Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV99215 JLH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
126665 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011).
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Spanierman
v.
Hughes329

Teacher interacted inappropriately with students
on MySpace page.

Snyder v.
Millersville
University330

Student teacher posted
“drunken pirate” picture
on MySpace page.

No, except
for an antiwar poem
that played
no role in
decision to
dismiss.
No.

89
N/A – but would
have failed; disruption would have outweighed
First
Amendment value of
speech.
N/A

329. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008).
330. Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943

(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
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TABLE 2: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF EDUCATOR SPEECH
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